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Recent Cases
sifies persons on the basis of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition,
or political affiliations, unless such
classification furthers a legitimate
state purpose; and 3) when any other
classification is made which does not
further an appropriate state interest.
The Louisiana Supreme Court
found that the plaintiffs could not show
that the law fell into any of the three
classifications. The court determined
that the nondisclosure law did not
conform to any of the categories in the
first two situations under the plain
language of the classifications. The
court further concluded that the third
situation did not apply because, under
the court's First Amendment analysis, the nondisclosure law furthered
the legitimate state interest of protecting
an individual's right to privacy. Therefore, the court held that the nondisclosure law did not violate the plaintiffs'
right to equal protection under the law.
Accident Reports No Longer Public
Documents
Finally, the plaintiffs contended
that the nondisclosure law violated
their right under the Louisiana Constitution to examine public documents.
The Louisiana Constitution, under Article XII, Section 3, provides that "[n]o

both focusing on the public nature of
accident reports. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Watson stated that
the nondisclosure law set a "dangerous and questionable precedent" by
restricting such fundamentally public
documents from public examination,
although granting access to the press.
Nevertheless, Watson agreed with the
majority's finding that the plaintiffs
had not carried their burden of showing that the law violated their constitutional rights.
In a dissent, Justice Kimball agreed
with the majority that protecting the
privacy rights of individuals is a significant state interest. However,
Kimball found that the majority's
analysis demonstrated that the law did
not further that interest since it allowed the press access to the accident
reports. Furthermore, Kimball argued
that by enacting the nondisclosure law,
the legislature had intruded upon the
exclusive province of the Louisiana
Supreme Court to regulate lawyers.
As a result, the justice concluded that
the nondisclosure law violated the First
Amendment, the equal protection
clause, and the separation of powers
principle. o:.
_ Christy Thouvenot

person shall be denied the right ... to

examine public documents, except in
cases established by law." Under the
exception contained in the constitutional provision, the court found that
access could be denied only where the
law states the bar on access to public
records "specifically and unequivocally." Here, the nondisclosure law
clearly exempted accident reports
from the provisions of public records
law, and limited their availability to a
narrow class of individuals. Finding
no ambiguity in the law, the supreme
court held that the nondisclosure law
withstood a constitutional challenge
on public access grounds.
Disagreementover Public
Documents
The majority's opinion triggered
concurring and dissenting opinions,
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Seventh Circuit Finds
Federal Aviation Act

Forecloses Recovery for
Airline Ticket

Purchasers
In Statland v. American Airlines,
Inc., 998 F.2d 539 (7th Cir. 1993), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that Section
411 (b) of the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. app. Section 1381(b), which
allows airlines to engage in certain
ticketing practices, does not create a
private right of action for airline ticket
purchasers. The court also found that
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, as
amended by the Airline Deregulation

Act, 49 U.S.C. app. Section 1305(a),
pre-empts state law claims challenging airline ticket refund policies.
PlaintiffSeeks Damages of $1.25
Iris Statland purchased an American Airlines ticket with a 10 percent
cancellation penalty. Upon cancellation, American Airlines withheld 10
percent of the federal tax paid on the
canceled ticket, or $1.25, in addition
to the cancellation fee. Statland subsequently brought a class action suit
in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois to recover her $1.25,
as well as similar refunds on behalf of
thousands of other ticket purchasers.
Statland claimed that the ticket she
purchased violated Section 411 (b) of
the Federal Aviation Act, as it did not
incorporate any contract provisions
allowing American Airlines to keep
10 percent of the federal tax upon
cancellation. She also brought four
supplemental state law claims: breach
of fiduciary duty; violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive
Practices Act; conversion; and breach
of contract.
The district court held that Section
411 (b) did not give Statland a federal
cause of action and dismissed the state
claims for lack of supplemental jurisdiction. Statland appealed to the Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Section 411(b) Does Not Create a
Private Right of Action
Addressing Statland's federal law
claim, the Seventh Circuit began with
an analysis of the statutory language.
The court noted that Section 411 (b),
describing the Department of
Transportation's (DOT) power to
regulate airlines ticket practices, is
framed as a general command to a
federal agency. As such, Section
411 (b) does not purport to create rights
for airline ticket purchasers. There
exists a strong presumption against
creating an implied private right of
action. Statland's suit seeks to enforce personal rights that are unnecessary to effect congressional intent.
The court reasoned that even though
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consumers benefit when a business
follows the law, it is insufficient to
infer congressional intent in order to
give those consumers a private cause
of action. As the court noted, "Statland
cannot bootstrap consumers' rights
into a law that does not mention them."
The Seventh Circuit then examined Section 41 l(b)'s position within
the Aviation Act. In the original Aviation Act, Section 411 appeared as a
single paragraph granting the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) express
power to regulate deceptive practices
or unfair methods of competition in
the airline industry. The Airline Deregulation Act amended the Aviation
Act, transferring CAB' s duties to other
agencies. Section 411 (b), as amended,
contains two provisions, 411 (a) (411
as originally written) and 411 (b). Both
provisions deal with the CAB's authority over commercial practices of
the airline industry.
In Polansky v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 523 F.2d 332, 338-40 (3rd
Cir. 1975), the Third Circuit determined that Section 411(a) does not
create a private right to sue. The
Seventh Circuit, finding nothing suggesting Section 411 (b) should be read
differently, also interpreted Section
411(a) as failing to create a private
right to sue.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit read
the legislative history of Section
411 (b) as indicating Congress' intent
to give the DOT, not private parties,
the right to enforce its provisions.
Pointing to statements in the House
Report highlighting the importance of
consumer protection and the DOT's
regulatory role in this area, the court
concluded that the DOT, not private
parties, will enforce consumer protection rules against airlines.
In affirming the district court's
decision regarding Statland's federal
claim, the Seventh Circuit held that
Section 41 l(b)'s language, structure,
and legislative history all indicate
Congress' intent to establish the
DOT's regulatory power over airlines
without implying a private right of
action for consumers. Since a private
66
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right of action need not be implied to
further this intent, the court held that
Section 411 (b) does not create one.
State Claims Pre-empted
The Seventh Circuit also addressed
Statland's state law claims. Having
held that Section 411 (b) did not give
Statland a federal cause of action, the
court retained jurisdiction over
Statland's state law claims to conserve state court resources.
Turning to the state claims, the
court noted that the Airline Deregulation Act added an express pre-emption
clause to the Aviation Act, providing
that states shall not "enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, stand, or
other provision having the force and
effect of law relating to rates, rules or
services of any carrier." 49 U.S.C.
App. Section 1305(a). These words
"express a broad preemptive purpose,"
Morales v. Trans WorldAirlines,Inc.,
__ U.S.
. .
112 S.Ct. 2031,
2037, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992),
whereby canceled ticket refunds relate to rates. Thus, Statland's state
law claims, falling within this ambit,
were pre-empted. *oJudith Gorske
-

Spiller, but Not Shipper
of Spilled Chemical,
Liable for Environmental
Cleanup Under CERCLA
In Amcast Indus. Corp. v. Detrex
Corp., 2 F.3d 746 (7th Cir. 1993), the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit held that a chemical
manufacturer is a "responsible person" under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42
U.S.C. Section 9601, et. seq. (1980).
As a consequence, the Seventh Circuit extended liability under CERCLA
to a manufacturer for chemicals spilled
from its own trucks, but not for chemicals spilled from trucks owned by a

common carrier the manufacturer
hired for delivery of the chemicals.
Chemical Spill Harms
Environment
Plaintiff, Elkhart Products Corporation (Elkhart), a subsidiary of
Amcast Industrial Corporation, manufactures copper fittings at its Indiana
plant. It uses the solvent trichloroethylene (TCE) in the manufacturing
process. Elkhart purchased TCE from
a number of chemical manufacturers,
including defendant Detrex Corporation (Detrex). Detrex often delivered
TCE to Elkhart in its own tanker trucks.
However, Detrex also frequently hired
a common carrier, Transport Services,
to deliver the solvent to Elkhart.
In 1984, the groundwater beneath a
pharmaceutical plant adjacent to
Elkhart's facility was contaminated
with TCE. An investigation revealed
that both Detrex's and Transport Services' drivers spilled TCE accidentally on Elkhart's premises while filling Elkhart's storage tanks. Some of
this spillage seeped into the groundwater beneath the pharmaceutical
plant.
Elkhart spent more than $1 million
to clean up the TCE contamination.
Elkhart later sued Detrex in order to
recover from the cost of eliminating
the TCE contamination to Detrex. The
trial court granted partial summary
judgment for each party and entered
judgment against Detrex for the entire
cleanup cost Elkhart had incurred.
Detrex appealed the trial court's decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
Detrex also filed a separate action in
district court for contribution against
Elkhart.
Response Costs, Facilities,and
Responsible Persons
CERCLA Section 9607(a)(1) imposes response costs, the costs of
eliminating an environmental hazard,
on the "owner and operator of a ...
facility" from which a hazardous substance has been released. CERCLA
Section 9607(a)(3) also places liabilLoyola Consumer Law Reporter

